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Abstract
BRENNA DEPIES: The Recent Trend of Mass

Killing: What Causes Civil Wars to

Escalate to Genocide?

(Under the direction of Dr. Megan Shannon)

In the last century the international community has become more concerned about
the damage that civil wars can cause. Over the years, more cases of civil war are reported
to lead into genocide, and this thesis looks to figure out why this is. There are many
scholarly theories about the origins of genocide, but I aim to focus strictly on those

genocides that occur in reaction to a civil conflict. When looking at the root causes of
conflict, I claim that civil wars are more likely to lead to the use of genocide if the origins
of the conflict are based on the combination of ethnic sovereignty issues and the
government’s response to a guerilla rebel force.
In analyzing this theory, I explore three cases of civil war. By doing a study of
two cases in which civil wars escalated to genocide and one civil war that did not
experience genocide, I claim that the theory of origins being the main reason for genocide
will be supported.
After comparing the three cases, it appears that this theory can be supported and
that the combination of ethnic tensions and guerilla warfare in a civil conflict will make
that war more prone to genocide.
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Introduction

After accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986, Elie Wiesel, a renowned author
and Holocaust survivor, expressed how he felt about the world forty years after Europe
had been liberated from Nazi power: “If someone had told us in 1945 that in our lifetime

religious wars would rage on virtually every continent, that thousands of children would
once again be dying of starvation, we would not have believed it. Or that racism and
fanaticism would flourish once again,” (Bartrop and Totten 2009, ix). The most terrifying

aspect of Wiesel’s observation is not only that the international community continued to
observe different acts of genocide without much reaction to them after the Holocaust, but
rather that in 1986 he had only witnessed a portion of the genocides that plagued the
twentieth century.
After the Holocaust, the phrase “Never Again” was often used when referring to
genocide (Kristof 2004). Nonetheless, genocide has continued to take place throughout

the world, and it is estimated that during the twentieth century between 60 million and
150 million people have died in episodes of mass killings (Valentino 2004, 1). ' With
these statistics it seems that genocide will continue throughout our future. Though at this
point there is no clear answer to genocide prevention, it is a topic that has been
' Estimated by Benjamin A. Valentino based on numerous sources. See Benjamin A. Valentino, Final
Solutions: Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20" Century (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press,
2004), Notes p. 1. The phrase “mass killings” is used here instead of “genocide” in order to follow suit with

Valentino’s intentional avoidance of the “difficulties” that come with the term “genocide.” He simply
defines mass killings as “the intentional killing ofa massive number of noncombatants.” See Valentino,
Final Solutions, pp. 6-10.
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thoroughly researched and studied. Many reasons for genocide have been theorized, and
it has been a subject that is greatly discussed, often with controversial outcomes.
However, the issue itself is so deeply debated that it is difficult to focus on which of these

theories would be able to fit all cases of genocide.
Because of the controversy this topic brings about and the reality that genocides
have been committed by and against an extensive range of states, cultures, governments,
and ethnic and religious groups, it is vital to look at various components of genocide and
its origins. One aspect that is valuable to examine is the geographical location of the
conflict and whether it is in reaction to another conflict. In the last century it has become
common for genocides to be a product of a separate civil conflict, which leads to the
belief that genocides within civil wars are different than genocides independent of civil
conflict.

Research Question
While various scholars have made up different theories that claim that most

genocides have similar origins, the relatively modern rise in the utilization of genocide
during intrastate conflicts influences the central research question for this thesis: Why

does genocide occur in some civil wars and not others? Especially in the late-twentieth
century, the probability of genocide occurring within a civil conflict has become more
prevelant, but current theories cannot fully predict when or why genocides will occur
during civil conflicts (Totten and Bartrop, ed. 2009; Wimmer 2004). Since the Holocaust,
scholars have analyzed and generated numerous theories on the causes of genocide, but

those cases in which the genocide is connected to an independent intrastate conflict
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should be examined separately in order to discover the distinctions between the two
situations. In the context of genocides that are associated with civil wars, this thesis aims
to explore why only some civil wars experience genocide while other civil wars do not.

Definitions

Civil War

For this thesis the definition of an armed conflict given by the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) will be used. This definition states that armed conflict is a

“contested incompatibility” that concerns a government and/or territory where armed
forces are used between the two opposing sides and results in a minimum 1,000 battlerelated deaths. Also, according do this definitions, one of the conflicting parties must be a
state government. Further, an internal armed conflict — also known as a civil war — is
when one side is the state’s government and the opposing side is an internal force

(Harbom and Wallensteen 2009, 586).
Genocide

For the purpose of this thesis, the definition of genocide as interpreted by the
Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide will be utilized.
As approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General
Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, Article 2 states:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:

e

(a) Killing members of the group;
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e

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

e

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

e
e

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This definition has become highly controversial over the twentieth century because,
in numerous scholars’ opinion, it appears to exclude various details and is often referred
to as the “compromise definition” (Trotten and Bartrop, ed. 2009, 34); this insinuates that

since the UN Convention’s interpretation was settled upon by committees comprised of
state actors, these representatives focused on their own national interests. Since 1948,

numerous scholars have generated their own definitions as alternatives to the one
presented by the UNGC in an effort to fill-in and correct what they consider to be its gaps
and deficiencies; some of these alternative definitions can be considered stronger than the

UNGC’s, but it is often the case that the new definitions are in some respects weaker and
may cause the understanding to become more confusing rather than providing clarity to
the defining qualifications (Trotten and Bartrop, ed. 2009; Flint 2005).
Despite the controversy, the definition given by the UNGC will be best suited for the

purpose of this thesis due to the fact that has been officially accepted by the international
community. The statements expressed in Article 2 and Article 3 of the UNGC are the
foundations upon which the Contracting Parties have a legal, if not also moral obligation
under Article 1 to “prevent and punish” those actors who have violated international law
(United Nations, General Assembly, 1948). Even though it may be highly debated, this
interpretation will create the most definite separation between cases of civil wars in
which genocide was present and cases of civil conflict in which genocide did not occur.
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Theory

The cause of genocide is a widespread debate that includes many defining factors.
It has been regularly examined and discussed since the Holocaust; however, no

conclusion has ever been unanimously agreed upon. This controversy is commonly
blamed on the lack of distinction between types of genocide that is necessary to have a
clear understanding of its origins. For this reason, this thesis will narrow down the topic
of genocide and will work to prove a theory on why genocide occurs only in certain civil
conflicts.

This theory will be tested by looking at various aspects of conflict and genocide,

but the main focus will be on tensions caused by ethnic differences and the use of guerilla
warfare. Both of these factors are prevalent in many modern conflicts, which is why it

has become increasingly important to study their effect on conflicts. After the end of the
Cold War, the system of war seemed to shift, and when examining the factors of conflict
in today’s world, it is found that there are many similarities among the world’s civil

conflicts, and these two components seem to have a strong influence.
Differences in ethnicity are typically difficult to determine because their borders
tend to be blurred and are constantly changing. As defined by Robin Williams, Jr., the
three most essential characteristics of ethnicity identification are:

1.

Cultural distinctiveness (a “range” itself, including language, food
preferences and taboos, songs, dances, literature, games, and so on);

2.
3.

Membership by birth (decent), endogamy (in-group marriage);
A population larger than small kinship units or face-to-face groups (2003,
13).
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It has always been a natural tendency for people to categorize themselves within ethnic
groups, causing divisions within the world’s population. Thus ethnicities have emerged
out of the universal process of self-grouping (Williams 2003, 12), and the idea of ethnic
identity has been around at least as long as history has been recorded (Wimmer et al.
2004, 26-7). Although ethnicity is one of many types of collective identity, it is
commonly set apart because of its tendency to create a sense of cultural membership.
Walker Connor (1992, 53) gives a good explanation of this by saying: “It is the intuitive
conviction of common descent that causes ethnonational identity to be more deeply
rooted and potent than are nonkinship group-identities, class, common religion, common
locale (or region), or common citizenship.” This has been true about ethnic identification
throughout history, yet, in the modern world it has become a topic of concern when in
regards to international peace.
In the post-Cold War era it has become increasingly common for civil wars to be
fought over terms of ethnic identity; this situation has become so relevant that it has been
calculated that the majority of civil conflicts since the end of World War II have been
fought over ethnic ties (Wimmer et al. 2004, 1). This modern increase in ethnic conflicts
is commonly blamed on the breakdown of competitive tension among the world’s
superpowers after the Cold War. Scholars like Paul Richards (2005, 8) claim that once
the threat of nuclear superpowers was gone, local hostilities were brought back up to the
surface, causing relatively small conflicts to ensue. The idea that local tensions were
renewed after the Cold War gives support to why so many civil conflicts in the last
century have been over ethnic differences.
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On the other hand, the “New Barbarism” theory stresses that culture and ethnicity
are ineradicable ideals that tend to materialize at the border between groups, rather than
being inherent to the individual groups. It is when these ethnic groups mobilize

themselves that tension emerges (Richards 2005, 8). In addition to the “New Barbarism”

process, the theory of ethnic competition explains that it is the recent breakdowns in
ethnic segregation that causes opposition; with the increasing trend of urban mobilization

around the world and the increase in opportunities that has resulted from social change,
ethnic groups are becoming more competitive, creating a spill over that causes ethnic
violence (Jenkins and Gottlieb, ed. 2007, 11). The belief that either materialized ethnic
borders or increased ethnic competition caused by migration into urban areas are not the
only current theories to why civil wars lead to genocide, but these two theories create an
understanding that while ethnic conflicts have been around for centuries, they do not
necessarily have the same origins (Wimmer et al. 2004, 29).
To further Williams’ definition of ethnic identification composition, he claims
that once given the basic criteria, ethnicity may be furthered denoted by any one or the
combination of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Geographic concentration, segregation;

5.

Historic homeland — fatherland, motherland;

6.
7.
8.
9.

Distinctive occupations;
Differential treatment by other ethnies;
Historical memories of a common past;
Strong sentiments of mutual obligation (solidarity);
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10. Claims for autonomy, resistance to outsiders;

11. Demonstrated capability for concerted action to defend or advance
common interests (Williams 2003, 13-4).
Though Williams brings a variety of claims to ethnic categorization, this thesis will focus
on the ideals in category number four, “geographic concentration,” and number ten,
“claims for autonomy, resistance to outsiders.” These categories have been chosen
because they are relevant factors to what causes ethnic tensions; it is these aspects of
ethnic composition that creates a struggle between various ethnic groups.
After looking at the influence that ethnic identity can have over populations, our
next goal is to see how geographic location can be vital to how people both distinguish
and fight over ethnic ties. This idea of territorial ownership does not necessarily refer to
possession of valuable land or property but rather, it concerns the question of who
belongs where (Valentino 2004, 5). Since the beginning of time, groups have conquered
and forced other groups out of their territory, but the legal formation of state borders has
caused ethnic groups to be more anxious about the territory on which they live (Flint

2005, 321).
Though this territorial anxiety has been present throughout history, official
boundaries between countries have caused it to become gradually more conventional to
remove any other groups (which tend to be formed by ethnic identification) who
encroach on the land that another group has claimed as its sovereign territory. In a sense,
the states have shaped ethnic identities by creating both national and individual
distinctions, in turn, causing the state to be a pre-determined setting for ethnic conflict
(Williams 2003, 64-79). As Valentino (2004, 5) explains, it is commonly thought that the
mass killing of ethnic groups has been the “result of deep-seated hatred of victims by
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perpetrators,” but he argues that this belief is not completely accurate. While some
amounts of hatred are assumingly required in order to kill massive amounts of people, it
is suggested that mass killing like this only occurs when the group’s leaders consider
their victims to pose such a threat to their group that the only way to solve the problem is
to destroy these groups’ ability to function or organize within society, or, when put in
extreme situations, to permanently remove these people from the world. This process is
often referred to as ethnic cleansing and has been the center of the majority of ethnic
conflicts around the turn of the twenty-first century; in order to gain control of that they
claim to be their homeland or national territory, groups will intentionally attempt to
“cleanse territories of minority populations... and thus create homogeneous ethnic
territories,” (Flint 2005, 322).

To add more to the equation of civil wars leading to genocidal actions, it has
become apparent that these ethnic territorial clashes are frequently in response to large
guerilla insurgencies. These insurgencies are defined as “an organized resistance
movement that uses subversion, sabotage and armed conflict to achieve its aims,”

(USMA). Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the current government in hopes of
reallocating power within the country. Furthermore, guerillas are the overt military
subcomponent of the insurgent force and are formed to carry out the actions necessary to
take the current system out of power, giving the insurgent force the ability to gain control
(USMA). In the case of civil wars, they are typically organized on the local level, and do
not have the legal powers of the state. Guerilla insurgencies are unprofessional armed
forces that tend to fight for legitimacy within the state and often power in the
government. Though they do not have the backing of the state government, guerilla
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insurgent forces tend to have strong feelings towards what they are fighting for, and their

commitment makes up for their lack of professional training; this often leads to a violent
and bloody conflict.
The tendency of a bloody war is also seemingly caused by the fact that guerrilla
movements are typically long-lived, which causes tensions to build and the state to react
with forces to contain them (Williams 2003, 183). Then, because it is difficult to
distinguish insurgents from innocent noncombatants, counterinsurgencies are encouraged
to take drastic measures, such as the intentional killing of civilians, in order to defeat the

threat that the insurgency’s guerilla tactics have posed upon their ethnic-based
sovereignty (Valentino 2004, 5). These guerilla forces are not used as conventional
warfare units, but gain control of the situation by using civilians as a cover and by
denying any unchallenged control over inhabited areas (Flint 2005, 24). The dependence
of the insurgents on the civilian populations for nourishment, shelter, and information
creates a largely immobile and defenseless noncombatant group throughout the
population, making it easy for the government to prey on these people. These
noncombatants then become the government’s target because they cannot be
distinguished from the insurgency of the guerilla group. Because of the lack of
distinction, conflict and attacks from the government can easily turn into genocide
(Valentino 2004, 5).
In Benjamin A. Valentino’s book Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in
the 20" Century (2004, 4-6), he theorizes that there are three main situations in which
genocide is likely: when communist regimes violently seek to transform and communize
their societies, when leaders believe that ethnic-cleansing is the only solution to the
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realistic or fictitious territorial threat imposed upon them by the victim, and when
regimes seek to crush guerilla insurgencies. For the purpose of this thesis, Valentino’s
theories about the origins of genocide will be used as a base and influential idea, but this
thesis will then expand and modify some details of the theory in order to produce an
original theory specifically for those genocides which occur in connection to another civil
conflict.

In considering the research question of this thesis, I theorize that the cause for
genocide to result from a civil war is the amalgamation of the violent reactions to an
ethnic-territorial threat and the actions taken in order to defeat any guerilla tactics that are
being implemented by large insurgent groups. In saying this, I predict that in order for
there to be the force and psychological desire necessary to commit genocide, the civil war
must have strong roots in ethnic territorial disagreements or assumed threats from the
opposing group and must be in response to an entrenched guerilla insurgency.
The popularity of research done on genocide has become prevalent throughout the
post-war period, and many opinions will be taken into account for this thesis. Since most
theories have strong reasoning behind them it is important for this work to analyze as
many of these ideas as possible. Nonetheless, through my study of three separate cases of
civil war in the post-war era, I believe that my previously stated theory will be supported.
I realize that it is highly possible that this may not be the only strongly supported,
educated view that exists as to why genocide occurs only in certain civil conflicts;
however, the majority of works that I have researched in order to come up with my
theory lead to the conclusion that there is not one single explanation for civil wars
resulting in genocide, but rather that it is the combination of ethnic identity issues and a
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reaction to guerilla insurgencies that causes a civil conflict to escalate to the use of
genocide.
Hypothesis
In addition to theorizing the causes of genocide in connection to civil conflicts,
this paper hopes to find support for a hypothesis. The hypothesis is derived from the
theory that I have proposed, but gives a stronger stance to what is being studied. Rather
than just examining the reasons for genocide this thesis also aims to take a stance on what
will continue to happen in the future. With this in mind, I hypothesize that if the
combination of ethnic group sovereignty issues and the threat of a guerilla insurgency is
present in a civil conflict, the conflict is more likely to devolve into genocide.
Methodology
In order to find an answer to my research question, I explore three countries that
have experienced a civil war. My first two cases are the Rwandan Civil War from 1990 to
1994 and the Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005; these two cases are my
experimental cases in which I investigate the causes of war and why both of these civil
wars resulted in genocide. The third case study I look at is the civil war in the Ivory Coast
from 2002 to 2007’; this case will be my control in the sense that I will analyze why this
civil war did not result in genocide.
In doing this I first lay out a brief background of the cases. Each conflict’s
background includes historical issues, facts about the state’s structural make-up, and

° The conflict that has arisen in the Ivory Coast in 2011 will be considered later in the chapter on the
Ivorian Civil War, but is not used in the main argument for this case study.
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information on the events that lead up to the beginning of the civil war. This historical
knowledge will offer a better understanding of why these civil wars occurred in each
country in the first place. Once the history of these countries is examined, | will be able

to determine the origins of conflict and will help give an understanding of how these
events were planned rather than being seemingly for no reason.
After examining the background of these three cases, I will then determine
whether or not each case has any of the origination factors that this thesis works to
examine: strong ethnic identity ties and the territorial ownership problems between these
ethnic groups, and action through guerilla insurgencies. I should be able to do this by
looking at each country’s history, culture, ethnic make-up, and reasons for and tactics
used in this war. Once I discover which issues relate to each case, I will be able to

compare and contrast the origins of conflict in each country, which will provide a basis
for determining why genocides occur during some civil wars.
I will then be able to use the origins of war in each case to either support or
contradict the hypothesis on the causes of genocides that are a result of intrastate conflict.
Depending on whether these cases support the theory or not will then allow me to address
the accuracy of my hypothesis that the presence of ethnic group sovereignty issues and
the threat of a guerilla insurgency during a civil conflict increase the chances of that
conflict experiencing genocide.
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Rwanda

The case of Rwanda has been chosen as a case for this thesis because of the
controversy it has caused in the international community. The Rwandan

Genocide has

become one of the most widely talked about genocides in modern history because even
though the international community had sworn to never let anything like the Holocaust
happen again, everyone stood by and watched as almost a million innocent people were
murdered. Unlike the Holocaust however, the Rwandan Genocide resulted from a civil
conflict that had been long coming. The civil war in Rwanda was a violent one, and
would ultimately lead to the mass killing of the Tutsi people and their supporters.
In the Rwanda case it is important to look at the formation of ethnical identities
that had always been present but were reinforced by colonial powers. Though these
ethnic groups had always been fairly separated, the Germans and then the Belgians gave
a stronger meaning to ethnic identity, and caused there to be tension between the two
main groups of the region. By the time that the colonial powers left, ethnic tensions were
more prevalent than ever.
The next outlying factor to look at in Rwanda is the relevance of guerilla forces.
Tutsi

populations

were

forced

out

of

Rwanda

by

the

Hutu

government

after

independence. By the end of the twentieth century, they had become tired of being exiled
and had formed an army strong enough to fight against the Rwandan national army.
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Following the tactics of an insurgent group, the Tutsi forces fought their way back into
Rwanda, causing the state government to be enraged. In response, the government tried to

fight back and push them out of Rwanda once again. Then, after the takeover of the
government by Hutu extremists, more violent actions were taken to stop the insurgency,
which resulted in genocide.
Rwanda is a case that has clear origins of conflict and can easily be evaluated.
Though this case was chosen because of its importance and reaction by the international
community, it also supports the theory of this thesis. This case’s obvious origins and
structure support the idea that civil wars are more likely to lead to genocide when they
are based on ethnic tensions and a reaction to a guerilla insurgency.
Background: Increasing Ethnic Tensions before the Civil War
The Pre-Colonial Period
For the majority of Rwandan history there have been three known ethnic groups.
The Twa are a small pygmy group — only about 1 percent of the current population -- and
were the original inhabitants of the area. Though it is unclear exactly when, the Hutu
people were the next to migrate into the region, probably in search of fertile lands. After
the Hutus had settled into their new home, the Tutsi people moved in from the North
around the 15" and 16" centuries. Since then, Rwanda has consisted of approximately
85-90 percent Hutu, 10-14 percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa pygmies. With time, the Twa
population became fairly insignificant, and the Hutus and Tutsis began to act as one.
Although the Hutu people were typically farmers and the Tutsis were known as the
herdsmen, the people of both ethnic groups began to intermingle. Eventually, these
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groups spoke the same language, shared the same religious beliefs, intermarried, and
lived in peaceful communities, with few divisions (Charney 1999; Gourevitch 1998). The
populations became so intertwined that some Hutus became herdsmen and some Tutsis
became cultivators, and a person of one ethnic group could become a hereditary member
of the other group. After a few centuries, ethnic distinctions appeared to be practically
non-existent.

Nonetheless, even with the intermingling, the tradition became that the Tutsis
held political power. Since cattle tended to have a higher value than agricultural goods,
the word Tutsi began to be associated with social and economical elite status, causing
them to be the rulers. This status created a caste system that was based on socioeconomic power, however, the titles of the original groups were upheld and political rule
and power appeared to be based purely on ethnicity (Gourevitch 1998).
There is no historical proof to whether or not there were ever tensions between the
groups in the centuries before colonialism. Though it is likely that the Hutu and Tutsi
people did not always agree on everything, the fact that they lived so interwoven gives
the sense that life was fairly peaceful in pre-colonial Rwanda. Even with political
authority being classified as a role taken by Tutsis, both of the groups seemed to accept
their class status and it is suggested that intergroup conflict was practically non-existent.
Colonial Effects on Ethnicity
This is the peaceful setting that German colonizers were met with upon entering
the Central African region that would later become to be known as Rwanda. They were
immediately welcomed by the Tutsi kings and began settling in. As colonial powers did
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in most of Africa, the Germans quickly promoted a separation between the two ethnic
groups based on a theory of “race science” by John Hanning Speke. In this theory, often
referred to as the Hamitic myth, Speke explained that certain ethnic groups in central
Africa had Ethiopian origins, making them closer to being European and saying that they
were the only source of knowledge and culture in the area. These groupings were
primarily based on physical traits; Hutus tend to have a shorter build with darker skin and
a more rounded face, while Tutsis more closely resemble white Europeans with a tall
build, lighter skin, and narrow faces (Gourevitch 1998; Scherrer 2002). In addition to
these physical traits, the European theory was further advanced by the fact that the Tutsi
people were also in a position of authority. Because of these two factors, colonization
created strict divisions between the natives.

In the new colonized state, the Germans established a rigid classification system
between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Continuing to utilize Speke’s methods of determining
racial differences, the colonizers drew on “scientific” measurements of the nose and skull

along with skin color to categorize the natives (Urvin 1997, 95). After World War I
Belgian colonial powers took control of the region, and classifications became very
important to the colonized state, causing everyone to be forced to carry an identification
card that showed to which ethnic group they belonged. In addition to the strict
identification system, the Belgian administration used the Tutsi kings as figurehead
leaders for the region; this system of indirect rule allowed the colonizing powers to have
control over the territory without having to invest in direct control, which gave the native
rulers a sense of importance. Education, administration jobs, and the army were reserved
for only Tutsis, causing the power of many of the Tutsi people to increase. Because of
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growing inequality, social relationships quickly changed within the Rwandan population:
As the Tutsis gained power and privilege, the Hutus were denied all such rights and were
quickly pushed to the bottom (Urvin 1997, 1999). Though the old monarchy from pre-

colonial times was intact, the nature of the system had completely changed, and tensions
that had not previously existed were starting to appear.
It appears that before colonization the caste system tended to use names of ancient
ethnic groups, but in reality was based on socio-economic divisions that had been
developed over the centuries. There is little evidence to believe that there was any sort of
ethnic tension before colonization, and when studying the effects that colonization had on
Rwanda, many scholars make it a point to confirm that there were no known conflicts

between the Hutus and Tutsis before colonization had come to an end (Urvin 1997, 93).
The colonial administration had taken a system that seemed to have been based on a
social caste and created a hierarchal structure that was based strictly on racial identities,
where the Tutsi people were clearly favored over the Hutu population (Valentino, 178).
The Post-Colonial State: “The Hutu Revolution”
When Belgium decided to join in the decolonization movement, their policies on
the Rwanda structure took a complete twist. Once they had decided that they would grant
independence, the colonizers began to give more support to the Hutu population (Prunier
1995, 49). As anti-colonial activities began in reaction to the power that had been given

to the Tutsis, the Belgian colonials and the Catholic Church (which had become a
prominent power since colonization had brought missionaries into the area) encouraged
the Hutu people to rise up; with this, Hutus were now permitted to participate in the same
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public service careers and higher education opportunities that had previously only been
given to Tutsis (Scherrer 2002, 28). The rigid ethnic system that had been created by the
colonizers was now not only being torn apart but was also being completely reversed.
Throughout the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, Rwanda saw a
series of actions that would change the state forever. As the Belgians slowly moved out
of the country, they supported Hutu power organizations, led by the radical Hutu
Emancipation Movement Party (PARMEHUTU), in gaining increasing amounts of
power. In 1957 a group of Hutu extremists drafted and issued the Hutu Manifesto, which
stated that there needed to be a change in power, ridding the state of what they considered
a Tutsi feudal system and creating a state that represented the majority of the population
(Gourevitch 1998; BBC News: Rwanda Timeline 2010) At this point it became clear that
it was not going to be a struggle for equality on either side but rather a question of who
would govern the ethnically bipolar state that colonization had created. Then, between

1958 and 1962 a small group of educated Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy.
This transition of power, often referred to as the “Hutu Revolution” or “Social
Revolution” of Rwanda, had its turning point in 1959 (Scherrer 2002, 28). In the year
before, pro-Hutu groups began to implement the use of localized pogroms, killing
hundreds of Tutsis and causing many to flee into neighboring countries. With the death of
King Mutara III, the remaining president from the Tutsi regime, on July 25, 1959, the
Hutu revolution groups had the turning point they needed to gain power. In the following
two years, the PARMEHUTU won a massive victory in the legislative elections,
overthrowing the monarchy and replacing it with a republic. Now that PARMEHUTU
was in power, anti-Tutsi sentiments grew rapidly throughout the country, and when the
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Tutsis who had fled the country tried to return in 1961- 63, they were immediately

rejected. The Tutsis launched minor guerilla assaults from neighboring Burundi and
Uganda in an attempt to return to their homeland, but they were easily stopped, leading to
organized mass killings of innocent Tutsi civilians within the country. By the end of
1963, it is estimated that up to 30,000 Tutsis had been killed and another 140,000 to

250,000 more had fled the country, meaning that up to 70 percent of the Tutsi population
had left Rwanda in fear of the new Hutu extremist government ( Urvin 1997; Urvin 1999;

Prunier 1995; Semujanga 2003). With the independence of Rwanda in 1962, the political
system became completely inverted, with a small Hutu elite becoming the new
governmental authority.
Over the next few decades, two Hutu presidents fought to hold on to state
legitimacy. The first regime, led by Grégoire Kayibanda from 1962 to 1973, used brute
force to gain legitimacy. During his time in power, Kayibanda acted as the mwami, or the
chief, of the Hutu people, instilling a sense of paternalism with his political rule. Rwanda
appeared to be a land of virtue, where hard work and good Catholic morals were
encouraged. This system of governing was possibly one of the factors that established a
foundation for the obedience that was shown during the genocide that would occur.
Nonetheless, while Kayibanda was creating a state that would he felt would be up to
European standards, the Tutsi populations were completely excluded from everything
(Prunier 1995, 54-61). By this time, the majority of the Tutsi population had either fled or
been exiled from Rwanda, and under Kayibanda’s orders, the remaining Tutsi politicians
and power holders, along with anyone who was in opposition to Hutu power, was either
imprisoned or killed (Urvin 1999, 257).
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The second Hutu regime started in July 1973 under a man named General Juvenal
Habyarimana. For the most part, Habyarimana’s coup was welcomed by the people of
Rwanda, as they were tired and scared of the destructive actions Kayibanda had
continued to take throughout his reign. Until the 1980s it seemed that Rwanda was going

to loosen up on its strict anti-Tutsi mandates. Though quotas of how many Tutsis were
allowed to participate in certain fields were still enforced and the country remained
dominated by Hutus, violence had decreased and was almost non-existent.
In the 1980s the struggles that Rwanda had been facing became apparent. Though
in reality the country had been facing economic problems since independence, it had
appeared to the world that economic development was on the rise. Massive amounts of
foreign aid were given to Rwanda at the time, making it seem like the state’s economy
was steadily rising out of debt. However, that money had not gone to the country as it
was supposed to but rather to the Hutu elite who were running the country. This reality
was revealed to the world when in the 1980s coffee and tea — two major exports from
Rwanda — had been overproduced and were in low demand (Scherrer 2002, 40). Because
of this, the market began to steadily decline and poverty increased, causing malnutrition
throughout the country to become a greater problem than it had previously been. In turn,
because there was not enough money, jobs, or food for everyone, Rwandan people began
to feel that the country had become overpopulated. The world finally began to recognize
that Rwanda was extremely poor and needed to stabilize its economy before the country
could even attempt to develop as a strong player in the world market. Once the world
began to look upon Rwanda as a country in need, Habyarimana realized that something
needed to be done about the economy. At this point, Rwanda was heavily dependent on
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foreign aid, which was something that the government agreed was necessary for the
country. In order to continue benefiting from foreign aid, Habyarimana knew that he was

going to have to make it at least appear to the world that he could create a stronger, more
unified state (Urvin 1997; Prunier 1995).
Habyarimana knew that he would never actually be able to unify everyone in
Rwanda while remaining a Hutu power, so in order to legitimize his authority he decided
to create a facade that would appeal to both the international community and the majority
of the domestic population. In order to do this, the General decided that he would focus
on uniting the Hutus, and began to take a nationalistic approach to strengthening the
country. In the decade before the civil war, Habyarimana developed the Hutu community

by reserving all positions of power and vertical mobility exclusively for the people that
were pro-Hutu. In accordance with the strengthening of Hutu power, the Tutsis became
discriminated against more than ever. Those Tutsis who had not already fled the country
were persecuted even more. Habyarimana hoped that by discriminating against the Tutsis
he would gain popularity among the Hutus, who made up the majority of the population
(Urvin 1997; Urvin 1999). Thus, hatred for the Tutsi people continued to grow among the
Hutus and extremist ideas became increasingly prominent in Rwanda.
The Formation of Rebel Forces
While this was all taking place in Rwanda, the exiled Tutsis were forming a rebel
movement in the neighboring countries. Previous attempts at returning to Rwanda had
been unsuccessful, but a new power was emerging among these groups. The Tutsi
refugees had done their best to make lives in their new lands, but not only did they feel

Depies 26

that it was unjust to be exiled from their homeland, the countries that had become their
home were beginning to resent their presence. They wanted to go back to their home
country, and so the Rwandan Patriotic Front was formed in 1987. Attempts had been

made to form a rebel force but two men, named Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, were
finally able to form a military that would be strong enough to become a threat to the
Rwandan government.
The RPF used the last few years of the 1980s to build a small army in hopes of
growing powerful enough to invade Rwanda and take back their right to a home where
they belonged. The RPF forces were not considered a professional army and the troops
were not well equipped or professionally trained, but they planned on using guerilla
tactics which they hoped would have the motivation behind it that it would take to
overtake the trained Hutu forces. Though it was an army of regular civilians, their plan
was to make unexpected and sporadic movements while using the cover of the civilian
population of Rwanda (Kuperman 2003 1-7). Guerilla warfare was their only chance
against the strong professional army they would be facing once they entered Rwandan
territory.
The Rwandan Civil War (1990-1993)
It was clear by 1988 that the RPF was planning on invading from Uganda, and
finally in October of 1990 they entered into Rwanda’s northern region. The Rwandan
Civil War had begun (Prunier 1995, 90-3). Hutu extremists, at this point, had exactly the
spark they needed to retaliate with violence. Habyarimana responded to the invasion with
both a counter-attack from the Rwandan army and a crackdown on the country’s
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residents in order to control everyone who may be supporting the rebel forces. With the
aid of the French, President Habyarimana quickly detained 10-15,000 opponents and set
up a strong counter-attack against the rebel forces. Over the next few years, war raged on
with Tutsi forces continuing to advance into Rwanda, with a hope of capturing Rwanda’s
capital city Kigali, and the Hutu-based Rwandan army retaliating with a strong counter-

offensive. Though the Rwandan forces were better prepared for the situation, the Tutsi
rebels put up a good fight, and until 1992 it seemed as if it was going to be a conflict
without end.

The international community, especially France and the United States, had begun
to strongly encourage a peace treaty between the two forces, and finally on July 10, 1992
both sides agreed to sign a cease-fire that would become to be known as the Arusha
Accords. Although they had made a promise to work towards peace, the RPF broke the
cease-fire after only seven months with a claim that President Habyarimana was not
putting very much effort into making concessions to the Tutsi forces, and was in fact
continuing to massacre Tutsi civilians. In response to the rebel forces renewed invasion,
foreign actors increased the pressure for a peace accord, and Habyarimana decided it was
in his best interest to give in and finally conceded to agreeing with all the RPF’s demands
in August of 1993 (Kuperman 2003, 6-13).
During this time, Hutu extremists followed along with President Habyarimana,
but disagreed with the relatively moderate actions he was taking to appease the
international community. By 1990, they had already produced the Hutu Ten
Commandments, which in summary stated that the Tutsi race was a problem and needed

to be destroyed so the Hutu people could live as they were meant to live (Gourevitch
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1998, 88-90). After this publication, it became clear that the Hutu extremists were

formulating a plan much like the Nazis had done in Germany with the Jews fifty years
prior. When Habyarimana conceded to the Tutsi demands and signed the Arusha
Accords, Hutu extremists decided that they were going to have to take things into their
own hands.

The Rwandan

Genocide

On April 6, 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing both him
and the president of Burundi. There is no evidence of who shot the plane down, but it is
often suspected that it was the doing of Hutu extremists whom had become fed up with
the President’s moderate stance on the situation. As soon as the plane was shot down it
acted as a trigger for groups of Hutus to immediately start murdering Tutsis that night. In
only a hundred days of genocide it is estimated that up to 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu
moderates were killed (Gourevitch 1998; BBC News Timeline: Rwanda 2010; Valentino

2004).
Though the world watched in awe, shocked that this was actually happening but
doing very little to prevent it, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was only the climax of a
series of murderous violence that had begun in the 1950s with the independence from
colonization and the Hutu Revolution (Murigande 2007). Ethnic tensions had grown so
strong that once Tutsi rebel forces made insurgent advances, the Hutu extremists felt it
was going to be necessary to completely eradicate the country of all Tutsi and Tutsi
supporters.
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Analysis of Cause of Genocide in Rwanda
When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, sparking a hundred days of
mass killings, the world created a variety of theories of what had happened to cause such

a catastrophe. Many scholars stick to certain theories on the origins of the Rwanda
genocide, but it cannot be narrowed down to a single reasoning. The genocide that
occurred in Rwanda in 1994 was not a sudden reaction to problems within the country
but rather a “final solution” to a problem that had been taking root since colonization
began. The German and Belgian colonizers came into Central Africa in hopes of personal
profit, without realizing that they were creating a monster. The colonial period created
ethnic tensions that would continue into present day. These tensions grew to the point
that even though by the time the genocide occurred most people in Rwanda had no idea
of the origin of one’s actual ethnicity, everyone identified each other by their claimed
ethnicity and hatred among the groups was on the rise.
While Habyarimana encouraged this growing spite between the ethnic groups in
the 1980s all they needed was a trigger to create a conflict. This came in 1990 when Tutsi
exiles attempted to return to Rwanda by military force. Though the Tutsis had the strong
passion and desire to return home that would be necessary to fight the opposing troops,
their military was no match for what was to come. This invasion of Tutsi forces into
Rwanda sparked a civil war, whose violence would only encourage the hatred that had
emerged in the pro-Hutu community. Though both sides signed the Arusha accords in the
summer of 1993, creating a cease-fire between the troops, it did not take long for the
tension to overtake the peace they had agreed on. According to the Hutu extremist
groups, President Habyarimana had not taken strong enough actions, and as soon as he
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was dead and out of the picture, they took matters into their own hands, murdering about
800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates.

The genocide in Rwanda was not a random act of violence, but was rather a

planned event. Ethnic tensions had overtaken any bit of decency that the Hutu extremists
may have had. They continued to dwell on the idea that the Tutsi people were outsiders
that had invaded and taken over the land that rightfully belonged to them. Though
ethnicity in this situation seems to have been fabricated by the Europeans, the Rwandan
citizens held on to Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities as a sense of personal identification. After
independence they held onto their ethnic identity so strongly that it turned into hatred for
each other. Ethnic tensions rose after the Hutus gained power as the Tutsi people were
oppressed and exiled from the country. Hostility between the two ethnic groups became
so severe that it was inevitable that a conflict would result.

With such strong ethnic tensions all it took was the Tutsi guerilla invasion for the
Hutus to want to eradicate them from at least their country, if not the whole world.
Because of the methods that the RPF used to come back into Rwanda, the Hutu
government was able to legitimize such a strong response. The Tutsis forcefully entered
into the northern border of Rwanda in hopes of gaining back representation in the
government and state. Though they did not think it necessary to completely take over the
government, they knew that in order to be allowed back into the country they were going
to have to revise the government’s structure. There forces had done the best they could to
train in the surrounding states, but they were not considered a professional army and did
not have the full equipment that the Rwandan national army was suited with. The
Rwandan government had not realized that the Tutsi forces would cause such trouble and

Depies 31

had become tired of their failed attempts to re-enter the country, causing a disturbance
among the civilian populations. The irregular warfare that began with the invasion of the
exiled Tutsi forces was violent, and when the Rwandan governmental forces realized that
the Tutsis were going to put up a strong front, they retaliated with severe measures that
would lead to genocide.
When the war in Rwanda broke out, the world witnessed a clear example of my
theory. Ethnic tensions had begun during colonization and had continued to gain strength
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. When the Tutsi forces invaded
Rwanda as an insurgent force, previous ethnic problems hit their climax. In all, Rwanda
is a clear case in which ethnic tensions combined with a government’s reactions to
guerilla warfare tactics lead to genocide. The animosity that had been built up between
the Hutu and Tutsi populations escalated to the point that the real shock should have been
if nothing came of it. When the Tutsi forces responded militarily, coming back into the
country with such irregular and motivated actions, it became inevitable that genocide
would occur. The only real surprise in this situation is that the world acted as if they had
not seen it coming.
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Sudan

The genocide in Sudan, like in Rwanda, disturbed the international community.
More actions were taken to stop this genocide because it was a case much like they had
seen before in Rwanda and the world did not want to see such devastation in Africa
again. This case has been chosen because of two reasons: Sudan suffered a long-lasting
civil war that ultimately led to genocide and because the reason for genocide has been
highly debated.

In the case of Sudan, this thesis will discuss the civil war that has been occurring

since the 1950s, but will then specifically examine one sultanate within the country called
Darfur. This region, home to roughly a fifth of Sudan’s total population, has always been
considered a separate entity even though it is located within the Sudanese borders.
Throughout time Darfur has continuously had a distinctive history, one that is connected
to the rest of the country, but has had many individual aspects. Though civil war has torn
through the entire country, attention was brought to Darfur when civil strife quickly
turned into genocide in 2003. This thesis plans to look into why exactly this region’s
conflict reached to the point of mass killing based on ethnicity.
The first factor to look at in the Sudan case is the ethnic make-up of the country.
The conflict was not between two opposing native groups but rather between the
indigenous Black Africans and the Arabs that had migrated into the region throughout
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history. When the Arabs moved into the area they began to force their culture and way of
life upon the native people, and British colonizers encouraged everyone to speak Arabic,
practice Islam, and follow the Arabic culture. The black natives were oppressed in this
system and tensions between the groups have been prevalent since colonization. For the
Arabic people it has been a power struggle in which they consider themselves superior to
the indigenous people and the Black Africans have come to hate those Arabs who have
suppressed their ancestry, culture, and tradition.
The other key factor to look at is the insurgent forces that the Black Africans
formed. The government since independence has consisted of Arab rulers, and the two
civil wars in Sudan were between the national army and the insurgent forces of the Black
Africans. The two ethnic groups are typically located in two sections of Sudan: the Arabs
in the North and the Black Africans in the South. The South, along with the state of
Darfur which is home to a large Black African population in the Northern-Central region
of the country, formed its own armed forces that aimed to take control of the government
and create a system in which all people were represented equally. This insurgent force
was not welcomed by the government and conflict ensued.
When beginning to look at the case of Sudan J was unsure if it was going to
support my theory, but after much research it appears that although there are many

factors of the genocide in Sudan, the reasons can be stripped apart and it appears that the
underlying origins are ethnic tensions and the reaction to a guerilla insurgency.
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Background: Foreign Influence
Arabic Culture in an African Sudan
The history of Sudan is long and complex, dating back to the Kingdom of Kush,
which began in 760 BC. For the majority of Sudanese history, this region was home to
various African tribes, who practiced individual cultural and religious practices. By the
seventh century, Islam had been brought into the region by traders from the Middle East,
and quickly replaced Christianity as the major religion of the area. Trade from the Middle
East and Europe had existed for thousands of years by this point, but the introduction and
acceptance of Islam would encourage further interaction. Power belonged to many
different groups, but for the majority of early history, Sudan was included in the Egyptian
Empire. Originally they had separate authority, but starting in the mid-seventeenth
century the Turks from Egypt started expanding the Ottoman Empire into the region
(Collins 2008; Deng 2001; Osman El-Tom 2006).
By 1820 the Turkish sultanate in Egypt began to officially establish his empire
within the Sudanese region. The invading group had great advantages in firepower, which
combined with the lack of unity in Sudan, made it an easy conquering mission. Within
the next few years, the Turks had gained complete control of the entire region
surrounding the Nile and began to enforce the ways of the Ottoman Empire. Because the
newly conquered Sudanese region was so large, it seemed that the Turco-Egyptian rule
had very little effect on the daily life of the native people. However, along with their
invasion and new political power, the Turks forced their culture upon the native
populations (Collins 2008, 10-3).
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The indigenous Sudanese people of the time probably did not realize how much
the Arabic culture would affect their lives. The new Turco-Egyptian ruling power worked
to turn Sudan into an assimilated extension of their kingdom. Rather than accepting the
cultures of the local tribes, they worked to create a unified culture, which was based on
the existing Ottoman Empire. It would not take long until the native Sudanese people
were following suit and most everyone began using Arabic as their first language and
Islam became the prominent religion of the area.
In 1881, a man named Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdallah claimed to have

dreamed that the Prophet was appointing him to be the “Expected Mahdi,” or the guided
one that would purify the Islamic practices of the area. In order to purify the Islamic
tradition, his vision required him to start religious wars, called jihad, against the Turkish
people who had taken over the Sudanese land. This period of jihad lasted until 1898 and
is often referred to as the years of the Mahdiya. Though these wars were based on the
ideals of religious reformation, they also obviously represented underlying tensions
between the native Sudanese people, who were now becoming known as the “black
Africans” of Sudan, and the Arabic populations who had recently migrated into the
region (Collins 21-8).

During the periods of Turkish rule and the Mahdiya in Darfur, collective revolts
in against the ruling authority were becoming increasingly common. The entire
population would join together to rebel against the oppressive occupying powers. These
revolts were often the result of policies that were created to control the divisions between
ethnicities, showing that Darfur was beginning to experience how Arabic power was
taking control (Hassan and Ray, 104); these revolts can be seen as a foreshadowing of the
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tensions and conflicts that would continue to plague the region because of the foreign
populations that had moved in and taken over.
Colonization: Growing Ethnic Tensions Encouraged by Foreign Powers

As tension in Sudan between the indigenous people and the Turkish conquerors
was on the rise, the European scramble for territory in Africa was at its peak. Sudan had
seemed immune to colonization, but in 1898, the British finally claimed control of the

area, creating the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The roots of trouble over territorial ownership
and ethnic influence would continue to grow in the period of British rule. With their
conquest, authority was now in the hands of the foreign whites. As in the rest of the
British colonies, the policy of indirect rule was established in Sudan, creating a system in
which British district officers would advise the local authority upon the governing laws.
This system was used so that the colonial powers would both save money and attempt to
stay out of the affairs of local customs. Their goal was to introduce modern European

ideals gradually so the balance of traditional society would stay intact while keeping
order through British law (Collins 2008; Jok 2007). This way, the British colonizers were
able to gain political, and eventually, social control while keeping a sense of peace and
stability among the local populations.
The colonial powers worked to govern Sudan as a single state, but often separated

the south in their policies. Southern Sudan consisted of mostly various non-Muslim, nonArab African ethnicities. The Turco-Egyptian Empire viewed this region as merely an
area to find slaves, and these groups had been left alone during the Mahdiya.
Nonetheless, the British decided to use this region and its people to promote non-Arab

Depies 37

ideals; once it was made navigable to get to the southern regions of Sudan, the colonizers
persuaded European missionaries to convert the African tribes from their individual
religions to Christianity and to teach them to speak English, often prohibiting the use of
the Arabic language or any cultural aspects that had been introduced by the Turks.
Compared to the Arabs who had previously imposed themselves into the region, the
European colonizers and missionaries were relatively amicable. In an attempt to fight
Arab influence, the British redeemed the South by terminating the slave trade between
the North and South, in which the Black Africans of the southern region were enslaved as

the property of the neighboring Arabs (Collins 2008; Deng 2001; Johnson 2003; Jok
2007; Poggo 2009).
Throughout the colonial period, the British continued to promote European and
Christian ideals, which in turn, discouraged all aspects of Arabic culture. These anti-Arab
policies quickly upset the northern region of Sudan, which was predominantly inhabited
by people of Arab descent. As the South began to unify under European influence, the
North worked to keep their way of life intact. In response to the entrenching culture, the

northern Arabs took things to the extreme. Rather than protecting their ways and keeping
their culture to themselves, the North began to make extra effort to spread its religion and
language to the South. Though not as consistently as it had during the Mahdiya period,
Jihad continued with increasing force. The difference this time was, however, that the
northern Arabs now had interest in integrating with the southern populations, who they
had previously considered to be only valuable as a slave. Integration between the North
and South was not a friendly interaction; the Arabs in the North had taken it upon
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themselves to fight against British powers, both through rebellion and the spreading of
their culture (Collins 2008; Deng 2001).
The British took full advantage of tensions that had been created between the
North and South. Throughout their rule, the colonial powers made an effort to separate

the two regions, with an emphasis on ethnic differences. Similar to how many colonized
parts of Africa were treated, the British created a tension between the populations of
Sudan that was primarily based on ethnic identification. This was rather easy to do since
the majority of the North consisted of Arab people and the majority of the South was
made up of what had become to be known as Black Africans. With British influence, all

problems between the two groups that concerned territory, religion, and language became
an ethnic issue.

Though rising tensions were affecting the entire country, Darfur seemed to be ina
greater crisis than the other Sudanese states. Since it stretches from the north to the south
on the western side of Darfur, influence comes from both regions. However, the majority
of the population has historically been Black African, causing it to be a target for the
Arabs in the North. Also, because of the concern for security of the British forces, they

chose to rule Darfur through “Native Administration,” in which the native people had a
stronger influence on the governance of the state than in other parts of the country (de
Waal 2004; Poggo 2009). This, in turn, made it easier for the Arabs to use Darfur as a

main location for their various jihad missions.
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Independence and Turmoil

As in the rest of colonized Africa, talk of independence began shortly after the
end of World War I. By 1953, sovereignty along with self-determination was granted to
Sudan through the Cairo Agreement between the political powers of Britain, Egypt, and
Northern Sudan. At this time southern parties began to be completely excluded from the
independence process. As steps towards independence continued, the South quickly
became irritated, and relations between the North and South began to deteriorate more

than ever before. In 1955, hostile sentiments from the South led to an attack that would
be known as the Torit Mutiny. In a response to the invasion of the military from the
North, the southern troops formed an attack on the northern officers, leading to a mutiny
that left approximately 360 dead. This attack caused a series of disturbances that lasted
throughout the year, but was finally ended when the Southern troops surrendered to the
government in August of 1955. Those troops who surrendered were led to believe that
they would be forgiven for their actions, but instead, they were immediately arrested and
sentenced to death (Daly 2007; Johnson 2003; Poggo 2009). The turmoil that was created

by the Torit Mutiny was the result of the discord that had been developing in Sudan for a
very long time.
On January 1, 1956 Sudan was granted complete independence. Though with
independence the Sudanese government had agreed to amnesty of the general population,

suppression of the South continued. The two years that followed the independence of
Sudan showed no improvements in the social political life of Southern Sudan (Poggo
2009, 52-4). The South’s next response to the suppression from the North was to demand

sovereignty through federation, but they were continuously denied by the Northern
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controlled government. Eventually, in 1957, the Southern representatives withdrew from

the National Committee, but then worked vigorously to gain worthy representation within
the national government, which they did later in the year (Johnson 2003; Poggo 2009).
In response to the lack of governmental representation, General Abboud —the
commander in chief of the national army — led a coup from the South, seizing power from
the recently elected government in November of 1958 (BBC News Timeline: Sudan
2011). The coup was well received by the North, but it only increased animosity in the
South. As Abboud’s government created strict policies, a guerilla movement began in the
South. This underground movement soon assumed the name “Anya-Nya,” unifying the
fairly secretive resistance movement that had been forming in the South. Though AnyaNya stayed relatively subdued for the first decade of independence, they were only using
time to gain power and plan for the perfect attack (Poggo 2009, 58-71).
Two Civil Wars

Sudan has been plagued with civil conflict since 1955. Though they are directly
related, the conflict in Sudan is typically divided into two separate civil wars; the First
Sudanese Civil War had its beginnings as early as 1955 but officially began in 1962 and
lasted for ten years until a peace agreement was signed in 1972. Then as a result of
remaining tensions left over from the first war, conflict broke out again, starting the
Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983. This period of war lasted over twenty years but
finally ended in 2005 (BBC News Timeline: Sudan 2011; Daly 2007).
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First Sudanese Civil War (1962-1972)
The First Civil War began in the South by the growing Anya-Nya movement that
had been forming since independence. The first few years of the war can be labeled as a
period of guerilla warfare. The guerilla forces from the South were typically not well

armed, making it easy for the Northern troops to suppress any aggressions (Johnson
2003, 30-2). The war continued on this way until October 1964, when the military
government run by General Abboud was overthrown in the October Revolution. By this
point, the Abboud regime had become isolated and had political parties, trade unionists,
and much of the youth allied against it. Though this opposition had been going on for a
few years by this point, in October the government was unable to suppress strikes that
were being held in the capital city of Khartoum. Once the military regimes had been
broken down, a transitional government was put in place; this transitional regime was
given the task of recreating an electoral system, where the rights and liberties would be
returned to the people. Within the next year it was set so that elections could be held
under the new constitution (Daly 2007; Daly and Sikainga 1993).
As it often happens, the promises and resolutions from the October Revolution
were never fulfilled. A series of parliamentary regimes control the next few years, where
attempts to create peace were made, but the South was never fully included in any
rulings. Though it seemed like things had become bad in Sudan, after the failure of the
parliamentary regimes things would only get worse. The Free Officers Movement
overthrew the parliament regime in May 1969, placing Colonel Jaafar Muhammad
Nimayri in charge of the new political system, known as the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). Instead of being the leader of the “popular forces” as they claimed, this
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new regimes followed closely to the previous military regime; the country was put under
socialist policies and Arab nationalist actions were backed more than ever. Due to the
oppressing restrictions that the RCC placed on the civilians, opposition came quickly.
After a coup in July 1971, of which the Nimayri regime barely survived, he realized that
it was going to be necessary to create a new provisional constitution that elected him
president. Nimayri’s biggest accomplishment came after his survival in the coup; after
realizing that he had created a monster of those whom he had oppressed, and that it could
possible cost him his life, Nimayri initiated secret talks with the rebel forces and in
February 1972 signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, ending the First Sudanese Civil War
(Collins 2008; Daly 2007; Daly and Sikaingo 1993).

The Middle Period
The Addis Ababa Agreement was negotiated with one precondition that Sudan
would have to become a united nation. Though it seemed like the best solution, the
people in the South were upset that they had not gained independence. The new
government contained a Regional Assembly, which made it possible for the Southern
Regional Government to exercise some power concerning the southern region of Sudan.
Also, in respect to security, the military was rearranged so that equal positions were
allotted to northern and southern troops. Although many guerilla forces in the South were
still quite unhappy about the agreements, there was still a lingering fear, and Southern
troops remained out of sight (Johnson 2003, 39-43).

Depies 43

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
In the early years of the 1980s, the Anya Nya split into two divisions; many of the
old forces were in agreement with the Addis Ababa Agreement, but a new section of
rebel forces still felt that they were not being given the rights that they had asked for. As
the Northern troops began invading the South again, the rebel forces gathered in the bush
waiting for the right overt action that would bring them all together as a militia once
again. An army was formed, under the name of SPLM/SPLA, and was composed of
mostly Southern Sudanese citizens in reaction to the failure of the former agreements,
foreshadowing another war. In 1983, the SPLM/SPLA announced its manifesto, in which

it reported that their goal was revolution, rather than separation; they planned that in the
end, Sudan would be developed as an equal nation rather than divided by race and
religion. The formation of this Southern army and its newly announced goals caused civil
war to break out once again in Sudan later that same year (Daly 2007; Johnson 2003).
For the first few years, the war was characterized by the same small guerilla
clashes between the national army and the SPLA that had been seen in the first civil war.
Even after Nimayri was removed from his position in 1985, which was something that
the SPLM/SPLA had felt was necessary, the war was nowhere close to ending. Coalition
governments were set up and ceasefires were attempted, but continued to fail because the
SPLM refused to participate until all political parties could be represented. Under the rule
of Sadiq al-Mahdi the Northern troops began to use tribal armies to fight against the
SPLM; the Southern forces then responded by attacking civilians in order to protect
themselves because it was unclear on who was a bystander and who was a part of the
military. As the war moved into the 1990s, attacks on civilians increased and the war
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began to be a big combination of human rights violations. Peace talks began in 1993 after
the defeat of the SPLA, but even though major efforts were made on both sides, and both
sides fully committed to a cease-fire, war raged on once again with small guerilla clashes
(Collins 2008; Johnson 2003).
Increased influence from foreign powers caused the two sides in Sudan to finally
agree on a new constitution in 1998. However, with the beginning of the exportation of
oil, a power struggle once again broke out. Over the next few years, a pattern formed in
which both sides continued to settle and make an agreement, but opposition to the final
agreement, usually from the South, tended to continue to prevent an actual cease-fire.
Even with the efforts that the North claimed to have made, the Southern population felt
that they were not being fairly represented in the National government, and continued to
attack. Though violence had not ended throughout the entire country, a peace agreement
was signed in 2005, and the UN Security Council authorized sanctions against anyone
who violated the peace plan (BBC News Timeline: Sudan 2011; Collins 2008; Johnson
2003; Jok 2007). This final peace agreement was the official end to the Second Civil War
in Sudan.

Genocide in Darfur

Though the civil war in Sudan supposedly ended in 2005, the conflict in Darfur
had become a separate problem by this point. Darfurians had been among the first to
understand the goals of the second Anya-Nya group; they believed that the only way to
bring Sudan together was to treat everyone equally, irrespective of ethnic origin, religion,
and culture (Khalid 2009). On the other end of the spectrum, in the late 1980s, an armed
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militia called the Janjaweed had formed; they were backed by the Sudanese government
but were separate from the Sudanese army. The Janjaweed began working towards what
they called a balance of Arabs, which required removing all non-Arabs from the region.
With this idea, the Janjaweed began to pillage cities in Darfur, murdering the Black
Africans in mass numbers. As the troops in the South had been doing, the people of
Darfur decided to take action and waged war against the Janjaweed that was being
supported by the oppressive governmental system in Khartoum. Without hesitation, the
national Sudanese army joined the Janjaweed forces and retaliated with extreme
violence, killing anyone in their way (Osman El-Tom 2006).
This stage of the war showed unprecedented state-sponsored violence and by
2002, the Black Africans of Darfur could not handle the violence anymore. Nonetheless,

rebel movements in Darfur continued, and by 2003 the national government had decided
to annihilate the opposing forces. With a massively destructive bombing assault, the
government made it clear that if the rebels continued with their insurgencies they were
going to increase the killing of innocent people. Yet the Darfurian rebel forces attacked
back with more force than ever, in turn, causing a good deal of damage to the government
military (Osman El-tom 2006, Reeves 2004). It seemed as if Khartoum’s efforts to stop
the rebel attacks were not going to bring an end to the conflict anytime soon.
Violence continued to rise in Darfur, and the years of 2003- 2004 presented the
bloodiest time the region had seen yet. Eventually, by March 2004, the fighting grew to
the point where it became clear that the Janjaweed was committing systematic killings of
mass amounts of non-Arab Sudanese citizens. Most of the victims of this massacre were
innocent civilians, who were being murdered in extremely brutal ways. A few months
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after this began, the international community started to agree that genocide was being
committed in Darfur. Once peace agreements were signed to end the civil war in 2005,
violence came to a halt, but undoubtedly picked up again a few years later. Violent
pillaging and massacres continued to sweep through the first few years of the twenty-first
century, and in the end it was estimated that about 300,000 people died in the conflict
(BBC News Timeline: Sudan 2011; Flint and de Waal 2008). Though violent clashes are
still going on today, the majority of the conflict lasted until 2005 when foreign reactions
caused humanitarian groups and the United Nations to take a stronger stance on the
situation.

Analysis of Cause of Genocide in Darfur
The problems that have existed in Sudan may have been ignited by outside
sources such as drought and famine, but the origins of conflict have always had a similar
base. Since the original introduction of Islam and then the migration of the Turkish
power, who brought with them the Arabic culture, ethnic tensions have been on the rise.
Then with British colonization, all problems of religion, language, and culture were
turned into ethnic issues, causing relations between the North and South of Sudan to
deteriorate.

After independence, the First Civil War brought guerilla warfare into the picture
of the Sudanese conflict. Conflict began in reaction to the oppression that the national
government had carried out against all non-Arab civilians after the British had handed
over political power. Each regime worked to create a stronger Sudan, but the most
common method of gaining legitimacy and unity in the country was to exclude the Black
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African populations who were typically located in the South. Then, with the Addis Ababa
Agreement, the First Civil War ended with a precondition that the country would have to
work as one unified nation rather than two separate entities. Even with this agreement,
the Black Africans were continuously oppressed by their northern Arab neighbors. Again,
in 1983, civil war broke out. This time the conflict became more violent and more about

the ethnic differences between the two groups. The Southern Black Africans were tired of
oppression, but the Northern Arabs had no intention of making them equal; the Black
Africans had originally been used as slaves by the Arabs who had migrated in centuries
before, and the Arabic population in Sudan did not seem to want to change their outlook
on these native groups.
As war raged on into the early twenty-first century, violence worsened, especially

in the region of Darfur. By 2004, foreign countries had agreed that the conflict in the
western state of Darfur was beginning to look like genocide. Fronted by a military group
who would become known as the Janjaweed, the Northern Arabs had decided that they

could no longer accept the Black African populations that resided in Darfur. The state
was too closely located to the North, and resources were plentiful in the area. Because
guerilla forces from the South had become so strong, the Janjaweed began killing of
mass numbers of Black Africans in order to rid the country of the non-Arab problem.
Though many of the people in Darfur practice Islam and speak Arabic, the color of their
skin has caused them to be considered Black Africans, making them an easy target for the
Janjaweed.
It is commonly asked why genocide occurred in Darfur and not the rest of the

country. Ethnic tensions and guerrilla insurgencies were present throughout the country,
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but Darfur became the center of the conflict. Because of its location, the Northern Arabs
believed that the area belonged to them more than any of the Southern regions. It was
easy to keep the Black Africans confined to the South under oppressive law, but the
Black Africans in Darfur were both closer to the North and put up a stronger fight.
Though most of the people in Darfur have identified themselves as Arabic, their skin
color and ancestry is shared with the Black African population, and the true Arabs had
kept them segregated. When the Black African citizens of the region formed a military
force and made attempts to fight back, the Janjaweed (which had also originated in
Darfur) and the Sudanese government decided they could tolerate it no more. Thus began

the systematic killing in the region that would turn into genocide.
Civil war in Sudan had been damaging enough to the country, but the conflict and
genocide in Darfur has created problems that will probably last forever. This genocide,
similar to the one in Rwanda that had previously plagued Africa, is a prime example of
how a civil war can result in genocide. Ethnic tensions between the Arabs and the Black
Africans had been built up by the various regimes throughout history, starting with the

Turco-Egyptian Empire and worsening with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Once
independence came, those Northern groups who claimed control took ethnic
identification to an extreme and over about a fifty year period built up a plan to rid the
country of all non-Arab people. This, in turn, caused a rebel reaction in which guerilla
forces from the South fought back. The reaction of the South against the government then
encouraged an armed insurgency from the Black Africans in the state of Darfur. As war
raged on, the Sudanese national government along with the newly formed Janjaweed did
what seemed necessary to terminate the problem; as had happened in so many other
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places, the government committed genocide in attempts to cleanse the land of all nonArab impurities. Though there were many other factors in this situation, when looking

back at the facts, there is a clear pattern that matched with other genocide cases, showing

that the civil wars in Sudan were inevitable to lead to genocide.
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Ivory Coast (Céte d’ Ivoire)
The Ivory Coast has been chosen as my third case study because while civil war
continues to be a problem in the country today, genocide has not resulted. News articles
continue to claim that the Ivorian Civil War (that has recently renewed) may lead to
genocide, but this thesis shows that the base factors of the war do not give support to this
claim.

The history of the Ivory Coast has been different than Rwanda or Sudan in that
personal identity has not been based on ethnic background. Instead they have created a
system of clientelism in which kinships and relations are based purely on economic
standards. This structure has been forming as long as historical evidence is known, but
when French colonial powers came in they increased the strength of these clientele
relations. Through the plantation economic system and the structure based on
assimilation and association, French colonial powers bonded the indigenous people,
giving them a nationalistic outlook on identity. After independence, regimes encouraged
nationalistic ideals and eventually identity was based on whether or not your family had
originated in the Ivory Coast.
Though the civil conflict in the Ivory Coast has had a very prominent use of
guerilla insurgencies, ethnicity has never become a problem. Most people in the area are
unaware of their ethnic background, and so the relations they have built created a system
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in which national belonging was the most important factor to identity. Since the war has
not had both of the determining factors of guerilla insurgencies and ethnic tensions,
genocide has not resulted. This is not to say that genocide will never occur in the Ivory
Coast, but when looking at the theory presented in this paper it is important to note that
after examination of the facts of the war it appears that genocide is unlikely to occur.
Background

Early Civilization: Clientele Relations
The Ivory Coast has always been the center of a multitude of African cultures. In
the beginning, three main civilizations (Kru-speakers in the southwest, Mande and
Voltaic-speakers in the north, and Akan-speakers in the southeast) bordered the coastal
territory, creating the basis of the how the Ivorian people and land is perceived. The
original inhabitants of the region that would become the Ivory Coast were “‘a scattering of
stateless societies whose hunter-warrior individualists rarely cultivated the land or

developed loyalties beyond village or patriclan,” (Chappell 1989, 676).
Interrelations between the early tribes were solely based on economic benefits,
which were, at the time, the main source of power. Intermarriage and societal relations
were generally conducted in order to increase legitimacy, mobility and economic power.
Early systems in the Ivory Coast were purely based on clientelism, which was a

socioeconomic mutualism in which groups would focus on their strengths in working and
would pay each other for one’s goods or services by trading back their goods or services;
everyone worked to their strength to create a balanced society. In this system,
memberships to kinships were often chosen by the individual. For example, the Baule
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clan encouraged the clientele system to the extent that men were able to select in which
household (from those of their four grandparents) they would claim membership; these
membership decisions tended to be solely based on which family group had the most to
offer the individual. As time went on, clientele relationships and interactions led the
assimilation of tribal groups to the point that ethnicity eventually became relative.
Though the tribal groups maintained their separation from each other, all forms of
communal identification had become too flexible and interrelated for there to be lucid
divisions in ethnic groups (Chappell 1989, 676-9).
Colonized by the French: Assimilation and Increased Integration

By the time that the Ivory Coast was forced under a French protectorate in 1842,
the Baule people had taken over the territory, and the indigenous people had learned to
adapt to competitive conditions, which inspired a tradition of political, economic, and
social innovation. Though there were still a large number of separate tribes in the area,
the French were introduced to a land that had created a sense of unity through clientelism.
As part of the scramble to split up Africa, the Ivory Coast was made into a French colony
in 1893 (BBC News Timeline: Ivory Coast 2011; Chappell 1989).

Though French colonial occupation was traumatic for the native population, it
also seemed to strengthen the clientele system that had been previously established.
France’s primary goal was to initiate and then boost the exportation of the area’s main
resources: cocoa, coffee, and palm oil. However, they were not graciously welcomed into
the area, and in order to avoid resistance, the French recruited local leaders to trade with

the interior for them. After the turn of the century, Gabriel Angoulvant was appointed
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governor of the new colony. He believed that his previous experience in Africa showed
that pacification was the only way in which the French would be able to benefit from the
land and people of the Cote d’Ivoire. In their agreements, the local kings were to follow
anti-slavery laws and ensure the protection of French trade, and in return the French
promised to not interfere with local traditions or the selection of rulers (Chappell 1989;
Handloff 1988). Needless to say, the French were not very good about keeping up their
side of the deal, and communal groupings and power structures were reformed to their
standards.

As French colonialism progressed in the Ivory Coast and the rest of French West
Africa, policies of assimilation and association were established. Both policies confirmed
the superiority of French authority, assimilation by forcing French culture, language, and
laws upon the natives and association by giving the local leaders the right to rule through

their own customs as long as it complied with the laws and interests of the French
colonizers. Before long, French officials took complete power, demoting local rulers to
the status of civil servants. In hopes of creating a colony that would be self-sufficient,

colonial powers initiated policies through which the native people were obligated to
secure any necessary resources; interference of the French powers in this system was
rare, and only used when it was absolutely crucial to remain in control (Handloff 1988).
A plantation economy was constructed within this system, which to the French was the
best way to keep power, but also opened up a new era of possibilities to the indigenous
populations.
As previously stated, production and exportation of the area’s natural resources,
especially cocoa and coffee, became one of the main objectives of French colonization in
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the Ivory Coast. The plantation economy that was created through crop production
increased mobility among the local tribes. The French did not take tribal or ethnic

differences into account when dividing the country into smaller districts, known as
cercles, in order to make resources production more efficient. With constant migration,
groups were forced more than ever to interact with one another, causing various cultures
to intermingle. Over time this economic system increased the already present clientelism
by undermining ancestral identification and giving everyone the opportunity to be unified
under a capitalist arena. Instead of causing tensions between the ethnic groups of the
region, French policies seemed to lessen any imbalances and problems between the
various ethnic groups. By the 1930s, a large number of foreigners had immigrated to the
Ivory Coast in hopes of profiting from the booming agricultural economy. Since most
Ivorians and foreign newcomers migrated as individuals, the economic system shaped the
communal and ethnic relationships that would carry into present day (Chappell 1989,

679-83).
The historical accounts available from the West African coastal region illustrate
that economic association in the Ivory Coast has been the primary defining factor of its
native people. Since trade began, clientelism encouraged interrelations among the
original tribes of the area. At the time of the French arrival, a system in which economic

power was the main benefactor to the fluid communal boundaries that had been
established. By forcing policies of assimilation and association, the native people were
stripped of any caste system that had previously divided ethnic tribes. Without realizing
the effects of their actions, the French, in certain aspects, had facilitated an integration
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system that created equality among the natives, which would be beneficial to the nation’s
future.

The Consequences of Independence

Independence came to the Ivory Coast in 1960. Since the end of the Second
World War, French territories had been gaining more liberties, and the transition to
independence went fairly smoothly because pro-French forces remained in control.

Ivorian leadership had begun with the formation of the Ivory Coast as a republic within
the French Community, but took real control after pulling itself from the Community and
gaining complete independence. The new constitution had the intentions of creating a
democratic government with a presidential system that would be checked by a separation
of powers, much like had been adopted in most Western countries. However, the actual
political practices that resulted did not conform to the democratic ideas that had been
promised. It was feared that allowing multiple parties into the race would create unrest,
so in the end, the election process made it impossible for more than one party to run, and
Felix Houphouet-Boigny became the first president of the Ivory Coast. In the beginning
of his presidency, Houphouet-Boigny struggled with deciding the best ways to rule,
specifically whether or not he should make a point try and included all ancient tribal

groups in national decision-making. For the next few years, public discontent was on the
rise until in 1963 success in power came through a system of check and balances that

used ethnic differences, political hostilities, and the formation of co-ops. Though the
democracy that had been established during the first Ivorian presidency was not as pure
as the Western world preferred, Houphouet-Boigny encouraged equal representation and
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headed a relatively successful presidential regime until his death in 1993. (BBC News
Timeline: Ivory Coast; Handloff 1988).

In 1990 opposition parties became legalized, and the next decade brought various
elected leaders. Henri Konan Bedie held the presidency after Houphouet-Boigny’s death.
During his reign opposing parties became enraged when in 1995 they suspected that
restrictions on their candidates had caused the election to be rigged. When, in 1999,
Alassame Ouattara announced that he would be running in the upcoming elections, the
country was split; opposition claimed that Ouattara was a national of Burkina Faso, not
Ivory Coast, and should not be allowed to run for presidency. Because of the controversy
Ouattara was banned from the election in 2000. Following this debate, Robert Guei
overthrew the Bedie government in a military coup, and announced himself president.
However, Guei was forced to flee by a popular uprising, and in October, Laurent Gbagbo,
the presumed winner of the election, was proclaimed president (BBC New Timeline:
Ivory Coast 2011; Nhema and Zeleza 2008).

President Houphouet-Boingy’s regime had formed a new identity rhetoric that
based itself on the question of citizenship in the Ivory Coast. This new sense of
identification, referred to as “Ivorité,” promoted the idea that indigenous Ivorians were
the superior people in the country. It was not a category of ethnic relations but rather
people were identified by their region of origin; all people who originated in the Ivory
Coast were included and anyone else was excluded from the new form of identification.
Though, in Houphouet-Boingy’s version of “Ivorité” some ethnic groups were deemed
superior, these groups were actually far from being based on ethnicity, and no matter the
ethnic group one belonged to, being of Ivorian origins was still greater than being a
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foreign migrant (Geschiere 2009; Nhema and Zeleza 2008). Rather than an ethnic
identity, the idea of “Ivorité” encouraged nationalistic identification.
Successive leaders in Ivory Coast failed at managing the complex system of
identities that had been constructed, causing a divide between the nation’s people. Even
after Gbagbo had been established as president, opposition with Ouattara was causing
problems throughout the country. In 2001 Gbagbo and Ouattara met in hopes of
reconciliation after the violent conflict between their supporters in October of the
previous year. When Ouattara’s party won the legislation majority after their meeting, a
re-vote was ordered, leading to outbreaks of violence in the north. Under pressure from
the newly interested international community, Ouattara was allowed to return to Ivory
Coast after having been exiled for a year by the Gbagbo regime. By 2002 attempts were
made at reconciliation and Ouattara’s Rally of the Republicans (RDR) party was offered
four minister positions (BBC New Timeline: Ivory Coast 2011; Nhema and Zeleza 2008).

Civil War

The Ivorian Civil War began on September 19, 2002 when a mutiny carried out
by soldiers in Abidjan turned into a full-blown rebellion. A cease-fire was immediately
established, but clashes over ownership of cocoa industries caused new rebel forces to
begin attacking west Ivorian villages. In January 2003 President Gbagbo agreed to a
peace settlement in which the government would transform into a power-sharing system.
Rebel forces were happy with this deal and another cease-fire was signed in May between
the national government and the opposing political rebel forces. By July 2003 it was
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announced that the civil war in Ivory Coast had come to an end (BBC News Timeline:
Ivory Coast 2011; Geschiere 2009).

It became clear later that year that even though the war had officially ended,

President Gbagbo had generate too strong of tensions for the opposition to be appeased
by an agreement to share political power. A month after the end of the civil war, a small
group of rebels was arrested for planning to assassinate the president. This once again

sparked violence, and the next year brought deadly clashes between the two forces.
Opposition crackdowns were enforced by Gbagbo, but rebel forces only retaliated with
further violence. The United Nations deployed forces at this point in order to carry out a
peacekeeping mission. Even with foreign troops in the country, the government
continued to attack the opposition. The French army was obliged to intervene after
Gbagbo initiated air raids to ambush and kill rebel forces. Once the UN imposed an arms
embargo in November 2004, the Ivorian government passed the reforms that had been
established in the 2003 peace agreement. The important factor of the government’s
reformation was that it made it so that future presidents of the Ivory Coast were not
required to have Ivorian parents. Once again, the opposing groups called for an
immediate end to the conflict. This time around, the peace lasted for a few months until a
renewal of massacres in the western region in June. Elections later that year were
cancelled after a mandate from the UN that stated that Gbagbo would be able to remain
president for another year. Though the elections were to be rescheduled and disarmament
began to be encouraged throughout the country, violence continued. Finally, under a new
power-sharing deal that had been mediated by Burkina Faso, President Gbagbo declared
in April 2007 that the war was officially over. Minor violent clashes continued as both
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militias began to disarm and the UN peacekeeping mission worked to ensure fair
elections in 2008. Over the next few years, both sides continued to disarm and work in
agreement to keep peace, and the UN began giving back control to the Ivory Coast. After
six years, peace had finally come over the Ivorian people (BBC News Timeline: Ivory
Coast 2011)
Current Threat of Genocide

Recently, the threat of civil war has reemerged in the Ivory Coast. In early
December 2010, elections revealed that Alassane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister of

the country, would become the new president. The current president, Laurent Gbagbo
used allies in the Constitutional Council to declare that the run-off between the two
candidates had been rigged; with this announcement, it was declared that Gbagbo would

continue his position as president. However, the United Nations decided that they would
not support Gbagbo, and recognized Ouattara as the new president-elect, an action that
was quickly endorsed by the rest of the international community. Military actions have
been threatened if Gabagbo refuses to cede power to Ouattara., and the UN has recently
made warnings that if the violence between the opposing groups throughout the country
does not stop then it is likely that civil war will result (BBC News Timeline: Ivory Coast
2011; Murphy 2010).
For the last couple of months, the UN and West African forces have been
debating whether or not they should intervene in the brewing conflict. The Ivory Coast’s
ambassador to the United Nations, Youssofou Bamba, has declared that the current

situation in his country could lead to genocide.

The problem with this theory, however, is
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that even though it does appear that mass violence will be in the Ivory Coast’s near
future, there are not many signs that lead to believe that this aggression is one-sided.
Those people who are fleeing the country belong to both political groups and come from
all different ethnic backgrounds (Dickinson 2011). So while there may be a current
threat, before making the assumption that this renewed conflict will result in genocide, it
needs to be realized that this case does not currently have the serious ethnic elements that
are typically the foundation for genocide in modern African nations.
Analysis
The case of Ivory Coast is quite different than the previous cases that this thesis
has examined. As Lauren Morris MacLean discovered in her study of local associational
life in Ivory Coast (2004), communal dependency has evolved to be based on a
nationalized clientele system. Although ethnicity has been relevant throughout history,
since trade began between the ancient tribes of the region, communal memberships have
been constructed through economic power relations. Before European influence, the
native tribes of the area became so integrated through intermarriage and trade relations
that there was no valid division between the groups. The tribes kept their name and
identity, but borders between the groups were too fluid to be considered truly separated.
As explained, French colonization only increased interaction between the native
people. Their plantation style economic system created equality between the tribes by
enforcing their superiority. Migration increased during the colonial period, causing the
people of the Ivory Coast to become integrated under what David Chappell (1989) refers
to as an “economic arena.” Without the intention doing so, the French colonial powers’
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oppression of the native population advanced the clientele relations that had originated in
early times.
After independence, personal identity became a large factor among the Ivorian
population. ‘Ivorité,’ the idea that the community of indigenous Ivorian people was
superior to the recently migrated groups, became a theme that was used by the early
political regimes of the Ivory Coast. By creating a sense of identity among its citizens,
the national government was able to gain legitimacy of power locally and internationally.
Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of Ivory Coast, played on this ideal to the point
that his successors were unable to control the complexity of Ivorian identity. However,
because it was so important, tensions between Ivorians and non-Ivorians arose.

Eventually civil war broke out in 2002 as a result of the growing hostilities. The election
between President Laurent Gbagbo and his opposition Alassane Ouattara initiated the
separation of groups between the two political parties because Ouattara did not have
Ivorian heritage.
Though violence during the Ivorian Civil War was engaged by guerilla rebel

forces, it is apparent that the conflict was missing an important factor that would have led
to genocide. As explained, ethnicity has always been a major factor throughout Ivorian
history, but it was not a leading cause of the conflict. Tensions were initiated by ideals of

identity, but rather than ethnic identity, the Ivorian people focused on national identity.
Ethnic tribes had been so interrelated by the time of the civil war that it was no longer a
viable questionable distinction. Instead, the people in Ivory Coast made connections with
their national heritage based on ancestral origins.
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It is because of the lack of importance of ethnic identity in the conflict that it has
not resulted in genocide. Even though there has been a guerilla insurgency that has gone
against the government in the case of the Ivory Coast, the reason for the conflict was
national identity and the tensions between natives and recent migrants. The country has
always consisted of multiple ethnic groups, but these groups have combined together to
work against the opposing force of the foreign migrants. My theory states that it is the
combination of ethnic tensions and the government’s reaction to a guerilla insurgency for
a civil war to be likely to lead to genocide; the case of the Ivory Coast is a clear case in
which genocide is unlikely to occur because there are not both of these factors.
This is not to say that there is no possibility that ethnic struggles will emerge and
the conflict in Ivory Coast, especially with violence once again on the rise, could lead to

the use of genocide. However, in the history of the state’s conflict, causes of the civil war
did not have the right criteria for genocide. Even though the government has continuously
used violence in order to control guerilla insurgencies, there would have had to been a
base of ethnic tensions for this conflict to escalate to genocide. The future of Ivory Coast
is unclear at this moment, but it is rational to say that the current threats of genocide are
minimal unless all the originating factors are modified to include ethnic tensions.
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Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to examine what causes civil wars to result in
genocide. Many scholars have created theories about the origins of genocide; however, it

seems more recently genocides have been produced by civil conflicts. Genocides have
been blamed on territorial ownership, ethnic tensions, political strife, along with many

other things, but controversy over the subject shows that genocides need to be narrowed
down by category in order to specify origins. This thesis looks at genocides that have
specifically come out of civil wars, claiming that their causes are unique. With all of this
in mind, the theory of this thesis laid out a combination of two reasons to why genocide
occurs during civil war. I have theorized that civil wars are more likely to lead to
genocide when the conflict is based on tensions over ethnic boundaries and the
government is fighting against guerilla insurgent forces. This theory is based on previous

ideas that have been discussed among scholars, but goes further to say that in order for
genocide as a result of a civil to occur the conflict should have the combination of these
two factors.

In order to test this theory, this thesis has studied three different cases, looking at

whether or not their civil war resulted in genocide. The first two cases, the Rwandan
Civil War and the Sudanese Civil War, were used as conflicts that resulted in genocide
and the third case, the Ivorian Civil War, was used to show a civil war that did not

experience genocide. Each of these cases is special in their own way, but after looking
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into the origin of conflict, it shows that Rwanda and Sudan are very similar, while the
Ivory Coast’s conflict came about for different reasons. Knowing that the cases follow
such a similarity pattern is the first step to showing support for the theory, and after much
research it can be concluded that the theory of this thesis can be supported.
Though they were different situations, both Rwanda and Sudan experienced
ethnic tensions and guerilla warfare that ultimately led to the use of genocide by the
states’ governments. In Rwanda, ethnic problems became relevant during colonial times,
in which the European’s created a rigid separation between the Hutus and Tutsis. Because
the colonial powers supported first the Tutsi people in power and then switched and
began to support Hutu power after independence, tensions between the groups had
formed out of fabricated notions of ethnicity. For almost fifty years the Hutu government
used oppression to control the Tutsi people, who they claimed had done the same to them
during their rule in the colonial period. Finally in 1990, the Tutsi populations decided to
take actions so that they would once again be able to live freely in the land that their
families had called home for centuries. In order to do so, the Tutsi forces used guerilla
attacks from neighboring countries to fight the Hutu government. The Tutsi forces
invaded the country as an unprofessional armed militia so that they could create a new
order from the current governmental system in Rwanda. War raged on for a few years,

consisting of competing waves of violence and peace. Though in 1994 the government
had reached a peace agreement with the rebel forces, Hutu-extremists felt that more
severe measures needed to be taken to put an end to the country’s problems and decided
to take matters into their own hands. After the president’s plane was mysteriously shot
down, a group of Hutu-extremists took power and began killing all the Tutsis that
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remained in the country. With looking at this, it is clear that the conflict was originally
based on ethnic factors, but when Tutsi forces began the use of guerilla warfare, the Hutu
government found it necessary to not only oppress and fight their opponents but to
completely destroy them.
In Sudan a very similar situation to Rwanda arose. Though there had been
tensions for centuries, ethnic problems began to escalate in Sudan when Arab forces
began to claim governmental control through the Turkish Empire. The region would have
remained peaceful, but the new Arab authority worked to rid the area of all previous
cultural aspects, making Islam the main religion and Arabic the prominent language.
When the British colonized the area they worked to increase the previous efforts and
enforced laws in order to impose the use of Arabic culture, in turn taking all power and
identity beliefs away from the native people. However, because the southern region of the

country was left unexplored until late in the game, these people continued with their
beliefs and cultures. By the time the British left in 1956, the North and South were
separated into Arab and Black African populations. The first civil war from 1962 to1972
consisted of attacks from both sides, and though peace was supposedly reached, tensions

between the two groups continued on and war recommenced in 1983. This time, many
attempts at peace were made, but the Arabic government never seemed willing to accept
the Black Africans and their cultures. In 2004 rebel groups in Darfur rose up in protest to
the government’s actions; the government quickly reacted, but with very extreme
methods. Over the next four years it became clear that the government was using
systematic killing to rid the region of all Black Africans, murdering them in massive
numbers. Tensions between the two ethnic groups had been present for a long time by
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this point, but eventually the government had become tired of the guerilla attacks from

rebel forces and decided it was necessary to kill all opposing forces, who coincidentally
were all Black African.

On the other hand, the Ivorian Civil War did experience guerilla warfare, but was

not truly based on ethnic tensions; some scholars have looked at the ethnic factors in the
Ivory Coast, but it has become clear that the reason for conflict was the tension between
communal groups that had been formed throughout history by clientele relations and the
new migrants to the area. Trade throughout the centuries had created a clientele system in
the Ivory Coast that formed a sense of community that was based on economic benefit
rather than family or ethnic ties. When the French colonized the area, their methods of
assimilation and association created a plantation system that increased interactions
between all groups, decreasing ethnic tensions in the region. Because all native people
were treated equally inferior by the French colonizers, they began to act as one unit. As
independence came, various leaders took power, but one major ideal that swept the nation
was the theory of the “Ivorité.” The people of the Ivory Coast began to base their identity
on whether or not they had originated from the area; all Ivory Coast natives were
accepted and all foreign migrants were considered to be outsiders. When Alassane
Ouattara, a native of Burkina-Faso, attempted to run for president, opposing groups
formed between those who supported native superiority and those who had migrated into
the area. These tensions took political party stances, but were ultimately based on
community identification. Though violence ensued and many people were killed, the
violent actions and deaths were on both sides. It appears that even though guerilla
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insurgent tactics were used in the conflict, because ethnicity was not a relevant factor, the
war never led to the use of genocide.
This thesis has suggested that civil war results in genocide when ethnic tensions

combine with government retaliations to guerilla tactics from a rebel force. Both the
Rwanda and the Sudan case support this theory. These wars both began with ethnic
tensions over who belonged in the area and violence increased when rebel forces made
attacks against the government. On the other hand, the Ivory Coast did not have the
originating factor of ethnic tensions, and though there were guerilla attacks, the war
ultimately did not lead to genocide. With the evidence shown, the theory of this thesis is
supported. Though many ideas on why genocide occurs have been explored, it appears
that this combination makes it most likely for civil wars to ultimately lead to the use of
genocide.
Though many civil wars have one of these two theorized factors, it is the merging
of them that make the conflict so deadly. Like previously stated, there are many reasons
in which genocide is used, but for a civil war to escalate to genocide certain factors are
needed. There have been many civil conflicts that have been either based on ethnic
tensions or consist of a government fighting a guerilla insurgency, but these wars are not
likely to lead to genocide unless something causes the tensions to intensify. However, the
combination of these two factors provides the intensity and hostility needed for a
government to decide that they need to eradicate the insurgent group. Ethnic tensions
tend to create hatred among groups that can be strong enough to lead to conflict, and the
formation of an insurgent force increases the hostile feelings that the government will
have against the opposing group; having to fight an insurgent group is the trigger that is
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needed to begin killing in mass numbers. The government wants to be rid of the opposing

ethnic group already, and because insurgent groups hide among civilians, genocide
becomes the only answer for the government.

The hypothesis of this thesis goes on the states that if the combination of ethnic

group sovereignty issues and the threat of a guerilla insurgency is present in a civil
conflict, the conflict is more likely to experience genocide. When these two factors are

present in a civil conflict, the conflict is more likely to ultimately lead to genocide. This
statement is based on the idea that both of these factors have such strong influence on the
conflict that the combination of the two will lead the state’s government to use their tool
of last resort, which is typically killing in mass numbers. There is no humanity to this
action, but in such a situation it often seems like the only response to the reoccurring

fighting within the country.

Depies 69

Final Thoughts
After the Holocaust the world claimed that they would never let anything like that
happen again. However, the international community has lived on with very little reaction
to the Rwandan Genocide, the Genocide in Darfur, and many other occurrences of mass
killings. It seems that rather than the phrase that has been so often used “Never Again”
the world watches as it happens again and again. Some attempts have been made to stop
genocide in different situations but no peacekeeping mission has been able to do the job.
Genocide is something that the average person tries to not think about, which is easy for
the typical westerner, especially because most American citizens have never witnessed
anything like the violence that has plagued Europe, African, and Asia. The term genocide
is typically avoided by the international community because if used they have the moral
responsibility to react and intervene. No matter what though, it seems that genocide will
never stop; we can theorize and plan all we want, but acts of genocide are more likely to
continue than to never happen again.
Genocide prevention has been unsuccessful throughout the years, and it seems
that it will continue to be unsuccessful. However, this thesis hopes to bring an
understanding to why it is that genocides have recently become a reoccurring factor in
civil conflicts. It is obvious that no work can bring an end to such violence, but the goal

of this thesis is to show why civil wars lead to genocide so that there can be a greater
understanding of global situations, and maybe such information as that which comes
from this thesis will lead to a breakthrough on how to stop the mass violence that has
continued to plague the world.
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In turn, this understanding of why genocide occurs in result of civil wars may lead
the international community to discover ways to either prevent future or genocides or to

at least decrease the damage that they could cause. This research shows that when civil
wars are based on ethnic tensions and the government’s reaction to guerilla insurgencies

they are more likely to result in genocide; in the future the international community may
be able to use this information to predict when a civil conflict could lead to genocide. If
we are able to determine when genocide will occur, foreign forces can intervene in
advance rather than until it is too late. Though it is unlikely that genocide will ever be
fully prevented, taking early action when we know it is likely to result can only help the
situation. With this research in mind, the international community could predict when

civil wars are likely to lead to genocide and may be able to decrease violence and the
ghastly death tolls that have historically come from civil wars resulting in genocide.
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